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PRIVACY AND OUTRAGE
by Jordan M. Blanke*
INTRODUCTION
It is not an understatement that technology has dramatically altered virtually
every aspect of our life in recent years. While technology has always driven change,
these changes are occurring more rapidly and more extensively than ever before.
We are fully entrenched in the world of Big Data, the Internet of Things, and Smart
Cities – and we are never going back. As always, society and its laws must evolve,
but it is not always an easy process.
The notion of privacy has certainly changed in our data-driven world and
continues to change daily. While it has always been difficult to define exactly what
privacy is, it is even more difficult to propose what privacy should become.
Technology and its uses – or abuses – are altering the notion of privacy into
something that may be unrecognizable in the near future.
Studies show that people say they are still concerned about privacy, but their
behavior does not reflect that.1 Like any value, the importance of privacy varies
from person to person. This makes it even more difficult to establish a one-sizefits-all concept of privacy. This paper explores some of the historical, legal, and
ethical development of privacy; discusses how some of the normative values of
privacy may survive or change; and examines how outrage has been – and will
continue to be – a driver of such change.
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PRIVACY
While a legally protected right to privacy in the United States traces its roots
back little more than a century and a quarter,2 privacy as a social value or norm
arguably has roots as old as humankind. In fact, one of the fathers of the notion of
modern privacy, Alan Westin, believed that the importance of privacy as a basic
characteristic is seen even among other species in the animal kingdom – “men and
animals share several basic mechanisms for claiming privacy among their own
fellows.”3
Westin described four basic states of privacy: 1) solitude – the desire of an
individual to separate from the group and be free, at least temporarily, from
observation by others; 2) intimacy – the ability of an individual to have a close
relationship with someone else in a pairing (e.g., marriage) or small group (e.g.,
family); 3) anonymity – the ability of a person to participate in a public forum or
venue, while being free from identification or surveillance; and 4) reserve – the
most subtle state, the “creation of a psychological barrier against unwanted
intrusion.”4 Westin also defined privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or
institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others.”5 We will see that this becomes a dominant
theme in privacy scholarship and is certainly relevant today.
Charles Fried stated that “[p]rivacy is not simply an absence of information
about what is in the minds of others; rather it is the control we have over information
about ourselves.”6 Similarly, Ruth Gavison described privacy as a form of limiting
access to oneself, and stated that the “concept of privacy . . . is a complex of . . .
three independent and irreducible elements: secrecy, anonymity, and solitude.”7
More recently Daniel Solove summarized six different conceptions of
privacy: 1) the right to be left alone; 2) limited access to the self; 3) secrecy; 4)
control over personal information; 5) personhood – “the protection of one’s
personality, individuality, and dignity;” and 6) intimacy. 8 He noted that there may
be overlap between and among the conceptions and that they are not independent
of one another, “[f]or example, control over personal information can be seen as a
subset of limited access to the self, which in turn bears significant similarities to
the right to be let alone.”9
2

The origin of privacy as a legal notion in the United States traces back to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis’s article proposing a right “to be let alone.” Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.R. 193, 206 (1890).
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ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM, 8-11 (1967).
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Id. at 32-34.
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Id. at 7.
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Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 477-78 (1968).
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9
Id.

2

Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet • Vol. 9 • 2018
Privacy and Outrage
________________________________________________________________________

There have been many different approaches to describing what privacy is
and what privacy should be throughout history10. It is a fundamental aspect of
humankind that has evolved and continues to evolve. Technology often drives
social change, and with respect to privacy, that has certainly been the case. As
society adapts, so does the notion of privacy.
NORMATIVE VALUES OF PRIVACY AND CONTEXT
Robert Post wrote about the normative values of privacy behind the
rationale for the four branches of the common law invasion of privacy tort11. In
discussing the intrusion branch, he cited Erving Goffman’s notion of “territories”
or “preserves” that help define a space in which someone could expect to have
privacy12 . These spaces are not defined by objective standards like feet or inches,
but rather by subjective standards that are socially determined based upon context.
In discussing the public disclosure branch, he again refers to Goffman’s notion of
“information preserves” or “boundaries” within which information is contained and
which are normatively determined13. “[J]ust as individuals expect to control certain
spatial territories, so they expect to control certain informational territories.”14 The
boundaries of these information spaces are determined by local custom and by “the
norm of the ordinary man” and are important in defining the standards of civility
which support the public disclosure tort.15 “Information preserves, like spatial
territories, provide a normative framework for the development of individual
personality. Just as we feel violated when our bedrooms are invaded, so we
10

See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE and PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, CONSUMER PRIVACY AND DATA
PROTECTION 25-45 (2015) for an excellent discussion on the history and evolution of the
definition and value of privacy.
11
Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law
Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 971-72 (1989). The four branches of the tort of invasion of privacy are
summarized in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977):
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the other.
(2) The right of privacy is invaded by:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another, as stated in
652B; or
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness, as stated in 652C; or
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life, as stated in
652D; or
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before
the public, as stated in 652E.
12
Post, supra note 9, at 971-72 (citing Erving Goffman, The Territories of the Self, in RELATIONS
IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC ORDER 28 (1971)).
13
Id. at 984.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 984-85.
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experience the inappropriate disclosure of private information as ‘pollutions or
defilements’”.16
Jeffrey Rosen continued the theme of privacy and context, describing how,
in “a world of short attention spans,” information can easily be taken out of
context.17 If personal information is shared in a group of people familiar with the
subject of the information, they can digest that information in context, weighing it
against other information they know about that person’s character and personality18.
If, however, that same information is shared with strangers, there is no context
against which the information can be judged19.
In her classic paper, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, Helen Nissenbaum
emphasized the importance of context: “A central tenet of contextual integrity is
that there are no arenas of life not governed by norms of information flow, no
information or spheres of life for which ‘anything goes’”20. Almost everything we
do “happens in a context not only of place but of politics, convention, and cultural
expectation.”21 In virtually every aspect of our daily life, we move among various
spheres, realms, or contexts – being at home with one’s family, visiting a doctor,
going to church – that are, to various degrees, defined by distinct sets of norms.
These spheres “offer a platform for a normative account of privacy in terms of
contextual integrity.”22
Nissenbaum stated that contextual norms can come from various sources,
including history, culture and law23. Many of them involve information. She
proposed “two types of informational norms: norms of appropriateness, and norms
of flow or distribution. Contextual integrity is maintained when both types of norms
are upheld, and it is violated when either of the norms is violated.”24
Contextual integrity often explains how social values evolve and become
part of the social structure and law. Nissenbaum stated that the “context of elections
for political office is [an example] of a settled normative framework.”25 There are
high expectations of privacy when people vote. They vote without anyone knowing
for whom or for what they voted. Unless they decide to share this information, no
one else will know. They fully control the flow of information.

16

Id. at 985.
Jeffrey Rosen, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA, 8 (2000).
18
Id. at 8-9.
19
Id. at 9.
20
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 137 (2004).
21
Id.
22
Id. at 138
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 146.
17
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In the United States, there are only a few areas in which individuals have
control over their information. If it is credit-related, medical-related or pertains to
video rental habits (amazingly), laws provide a degree of control over the
information flow26.For the most part, however, if the information pertains to
anything else, there is very little law that controls the flow. Changes in law are often
driven by changes in values. Is it possible that sufficient change in the normative
values of privacy – particularly in the flow of information – can dictate changes in
the law? Is it possible that such changes in normative values can sufficiently modify
behavior even without changes in the law?
One of the cases that Nissenbaum examined in her 2004 article dealt with
consumer profiling and data mining27.The issues she presented then have only been
exacerbated over time. With regard to consumer profiling and data mining,
Nissenbaum noted that “the crucial issue is not whether the information is private
or public, gathered from private or public settings, but whether the action breaches
contextual integrity.”28 With the proliferation of collection of data from sensors,
smart phones and the Web, and the advent of Smart Cities, and the trend towards
the merger of public and private data, this observation becomes even more
significant and more prescient.
Nissenbaum shows how Amazon.com’s use of data analytics on
information provided to it by its customers arguably does not breach either the norm
of appropriateness or the norm of flow29. A grocer’s collection of information about
customers’ vacation or movie choices might not breach the norm of
appropriateness. But if that grocer then sells the information to a data broker, where
that information will likely be used out of context, there may very well be breaches
of both the norms of appropriateness and flow. Society surpasses these examples
from 2004, but is it still possible that our privacy norms can be modified? Can
society develop a different value expectation regarding the collection or use of
information? Is it possible to develop a new normative expectation of privacy in
information?
Adam Moore gives an extreme example of the type of data shifting – or
breach of contextual integrity – that Nissenbaum described30. Actress Rebecca
Schaeffer provided her home address to her local department of motor vehicles,
who then sold it to a data broker, who then sold it to a man, who went to Schaeffer’s
26

Privacy protection in the United States is very sectoral in its approach. For example, information
relating to credit ratings is highly regulated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) (15
U.S.C. § 1681); medical information is highly regulated under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) (P.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936, enacted August 21, 1996); and
video rental habits are highly regulated under the Video Privacy Protection Act (18 U.S.C. §
2710). Information not regulated by one of these specific laws is subject to very little regulation.
27
Nissenbaum, supra note 20, at 152.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 152-53.
30
Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV 809, 826 (2007).
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house, and murdered her. Moore sees digitization and aggregation of data as
making the potential for this type of misuse even more likely31. Certainly this is
even more true today. Aggregation of data has reached a point where it is
questionable whether uses of data can even be separated anymore.
Anita Allen writes that she has “explored the normative ethical value of
privacy, evaluated the normative ethics of privacy laws, and pondered the extent of
normative ethical obligations to protect one’s own and others’ privacy.”32 Recently
she questions whether “individuals . . . have a moral obligation to protect their own
privacy information.”33 Focusing on information privacy, she describes the current
era as the “Great Privacy Give-Away,” in which people are “giving away more and
more personal data to intimates and strangers for a variety of . . . reasons.”34 Allen
stated,
Among duties to self is a duty to protect one's own informational
privacy. One ought to limit disclosures of information about oneself
for utility reasons, pertaining to one's reputation and future
opportunity; and/or virtue reasons, pertaining to modesty, reserve
and temperance; and/or Kantian reasons, pertaining to dignity, selfrespect, autonomy, and freedom.35
In a presentation of Allen’s recent paper regarding New York’s decision to
protect a photographer who took photographs of people, in various intimate
positions, through the open windows of their homes, there was a discussion about
how social norms of price vary36. A woman from the Netherlands said that back
home many people also do not have curtains on ground floor apartments, but it is
custom not to look into another person’s home. She stated that children are taught
this at an early age and it has become a social norm there.
Certainly, social norms are affected by many things – morals, ethics,
values, customs, expectations, technology – and these change over time. Allen
notes that within her lifetime it used to be socially – and legally – acceptable to
ban marriage between people of different races37. Until very recently, marriage
between people of the same gender was illegal. It was not until social values and
31

Id.
Anita L. Allen, Privacy Law: Positive Theory and Normative Practice, 126 HARV. L. REV. 241,
241 (2010).
33
Anita L. Allen, An Ethical Duty to Protect One’s Own Information Privacy?, 64 ALA. L. REV.
845, 846 (2013).
34
Id. at 846-47.
35
Id. at 852.
36
Ninth Annual Privacy Law Scholars Conference at the George Washington University School of
Law, June 2, 2016. See infra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
37
Allen, supra note 33, at 849.
32
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norms changed sufficiently enough that there became a demand that the law
change as well.
Roger Ford provided several examples of how social norms change, some
becoming more permissive and some more restrictive, and how this sometimes also
prompts changes in law38. He discussed how Douglas Ginsburg’s admission in 1987
of marijuana use basically derailed his Supreme Court nomination. He also
discussed how subsequent admissions by Clarence Thomas, Bill Clinton and
Barack Obama did little more than make news headlines39. He noted how, as
recently as 1968, “George Wallace won five states and forty-six electoral votes,
running for president on an openly segregationist platform – a result that would be
unimaginable today.”40 Social norms can and do change over time.
Ford discussed how privacy norms regarding information flows have
become less permissive as more and more information is being collected and used
for, among other things, targeted advertising. He noted that some privacy norms
have changed over the years to become more protective of privacy. For example,
voting in the 1880s and 1890s, student records under FERPA in 1974, and sensitive
personal information in federal court filings in 2007.41 While each of these
examples involved changes of law, they were, as is often the case, a response to
changing social norms.42 Ford gave an example of Nissenbaum’s contextual
integrity: “[n]o one blinks an eye when a dating website asks someone about his or
her romantic preferences . . . but it would be strange if Amazon, or the DMV, started
asking shoppers or applicants for driver’s licenses if they prefer blondes or
brunettes.”43 Ford wrote his article in 2016. Unless our normative values of privacy
and/or our laws change soon, there will be no need for Amazon or the DMV to ask
that question – they will already know.
WHAT WILL IT TAKE TO CHANGE?
Much has been written in the last fifty years about the normative nature of
privacy because of the Katz decision, and the importance of its normative
reasonable expectation of privacy standard44. Unfortunately, much of the evolution

38

Roger Allan Ford, Unilateral Invasions of Privacy, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2016).
Id. at 1090.
40
Id. at 1090 n.53.
41
Id. at 1091.
42
Id. at 1092.
43
Id. at 1090.
44
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). The test has both a
subjective and an objective part, although in recent years, there has been discussion that, as
originally proposed, the test was to have had only an objective part. See Peter Winn, Katz and the
Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2009);
Harvey A. Schneider, Katz v. United States: The Untold Story, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 13 (2009);
39
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of privacy in a digital world was thwarted by the events of 9/11 in 2001, which
placed an almost insurmountable weight on the scales of the privacy versus security
balancing test. For mostly understandable reasons, security is given great
deference.
In describing what he says might be called the “security trumps” view – that
“whenever privacy and security conflict, security wins”, Adam Moore disputes why
this view would have to be adopted over a “privacy trumps” view.45 He questions
why a strong privacy interest in ownership of data, for example, would not be “at
least as fundamental or intuitively weighty as security.”46 Additional interest in
privacy could actually increase security. He claims that “it is false to claim that
more privacy means less security or that more security means less privacy.”47
Moore concludes that a “transparent society is not inevitable. Privacy at the
personal level can be secured through custom and social pressure. Privacy related
to big media, corporations and the state can be guaranteed by law and grounded in
customs and social practices.”48
The drive for transparency in cities and states adopting open records or open
government laws provides another forum in which this issue may evolve49. There
will be massive amounts of information, collected from a variety of sources – both
public and private – and potentially used for a variety of purposes. Many of the
same issues that apply to Nissenbaum’s example of consumer profiling and data
mining will apply here. Certainly there will be numerous issues of contextual
integrity. Cities, like Seattle, which is using an open, collaborative, and iterative
approach, are trying to develop new models for protecting privacy and may be
instrumental in developing new norms and expectations for privacy50.

Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective Expectations, 82 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 113 (2015).
45
Adam D. Moore, Toward Informational Privacy Rights, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV 809, 839-40
(2007). There is a growing realization that privacy and security are intricately and necessarily
intertwined. Often, one who works in security views privacy as a subset of security, and one who
works in privacy views security as a subset of privacy. It is becoming apparent that the two
interests are enhanced and stronger when designed and developed together. See Security and
Privacy Controls for Information Systems, Draft NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5,
August 2017, http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/drafts/800-53/sp800-53r5-draft.pdf (last visited
Sept. 5, 2017).
46
Id. at 840.
47
Id.
48
Id. at 844.
49
See What is Open Data? Open Data Handbook, http://opendatahandbook.org/guide/en/ (last
visited Sept. 5, 2017); The 8 Principles of Open Government Data, https://opengovdata.org/ (last
visited Sept. 5, 2017).
50
See Janine S. Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy,
68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 332-34 (2017).
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OUTRAGE
One of the things that can potentially shape a new norm is outrage. If enough
people are outraged about an activity that violates a norm - or about a new activity
for which there may not yet be a norm – change may result. For example, suppose
an individual receives an email saying, “We notice how you voted for Reagan and
Bush back in the 1980s, but that you then voted for Clinton and Obama in the 1990s
and 2000s. We want you back. Please vote for the Republican candidate this
year!”51 Most people probably would be outraged. There are very strong social
norms with regard to the privacy of information about voting – there are also laws
protecting that privacy52.
Several years back, there was an outcry when CVS sent non-customers a
letter basically saying, “[w]e see your prescription for Prozac is about to run out.
Why don’t you transfer your prescription to us and we’ll give you $20 off?” Many
people were outraged at this seeming breach of privacy – at least what many people
probably would have considered to be a breach of privacy.53 And because it
involved medical information, it also probably violated the law. In our current
environment of Big Data and The Internet of Everything, there have certainly been
many more examples of this type of use of data that would reach or exceed one's
creepiness comfort level54.
Data brokers, search engines, websites, apps and just about anything else
capable of collecting information does so today. It is easy to say, “You have zero
privacy. Get over it.”55 Regarding the massive amount of personal information that
has already been collected, it is easy to think, “the cow is already out of the barn,”
or “the cat is already out of the bag.” And to some extent, that is no doubt true.
51

Or “We notice that you voted for Clinton and Obama. Why did you vote for Trump? We want
you back. Please vote for the Democratic candidate this year!”
52
See Caitriona Fitzgerald, Pamela Smith &Susannah Goodman, The Secret Ballot at Risk:
Recommendations for Protecting Democracy (Aug. 18, 2016), http://secretballotatrisk.org/SecretBallot-At-Risk.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2017).
53
See Health Privacy Stories (Mar. 5, 2007),
https://www.cdt.org/files/healthprivacy/20080311stories.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2017); David
Lazarus, Opening Your Pill Box for Bulk Mailers (June 11, 2008),
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jun/11/business/fi-lazarus11 (last visited Sept. 5, 2017).
54
See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59 (2013); Anna Johnston, Creepiness is in the Eye of the
Beholder (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.salingerprivacy.com.au/2015/10/15/creepiness/ (last visited
Sept. 5, 2017); Sid Lipsey, Collecting Customer Data Without Being Creepy,
https://relate.zendesk.com/articles/collecting-customer-data-without-creepiness/ (last visited Sept.
5, 2017).
55
Edward C. Baig, Marcia Stepanek &Neil Gross, Privacy: The Internet Wants Your Personal
Information, What's in It for You?, BUS. WK., Apr. 5, 1999, at 84 (quoting Scott McNealy, CEO of
Sun Microsystems, at a product launch).
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However, there are still abuses that can come from additional sharing of the data –
certainly from cross-contextual uses – that can be avoided.
Bryce Newell wrote about defining a normative definition of informational
privacy that would include “the right to control both initial and subsequent uses of
personal information.”56 He stated that this right “should have legal ‘teeth.’”57 The
absence of teeth in privacy law today is best illustrated by the many examples of
leaked nude photographs of celebrities. For the most part, once the image is out of
the barn or out of the bag, it is gone. There has been very little that one can do to
enforce such a violation of privacy. Privacy law just has not had “teeth.”
Due in great part to public outrage, we are finally beginning to see some
change. Privacy law may actually be cutting some “baby teeth.” In 2011, two nude
selfies of Scarlett Johansson were published on the Web. Aware of the lack of
success by previous attempts to threaten lawsuits alleging invasion of privacy,
Johansson instead turned to copyright law, complete with its full set of teeth.
Utilizing the “takedown” provision of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, a very
toothy provision, she notified websites that they were displaying copyrighted
content and that they risked liability under copyright law if they failed to remove
the photos58. This resulted in far more websites removing the photos than if the
threat had been merely one involving privacy violations.
However, somewhat surprisingly, the hacker who stole the photos from
Johansson’s email account was prosecuted, and pleaded guilty to violations of the
federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), and was sentenced to the
maximum 10 years in prison59. The court found that Johansson (and the other
celebrities involved) had suffered both economic loss and severe emotional
distress60. The Assistant Director in charge of the local FBI office stated that
defendant’s actions were “tantamount to breaking and entering of [the celebrities’]
private homes by a thief in the night.”61 Consistent with slowly changing societal
56

Bryce Clayton Newell, Crossing Lenses: Policing’s New Visibility and the Role of “Smartphone
Journalism” as a Form of Freedom-Preserving Reciprocal Surveillance, 34 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 59, 75 (2014).
57
Id.
58
Pursuant to Section 512(g)(1) of Title 17 of the United States Code, “a service provider shall not
be liable to any person for any claim based on the service providers’ good faith disabling of access
to, or removal of, material . . . regardless of whether the material or activity is ultimately
determined to be infringing.” 17 U.S.C. § 512(g)(1). This so-called “DCMA takedown notice” has
become extremely common as a way of preventing liability for copyright infringement. Regardless
of whether there might be infringement, taking down the allegedly infringing item is an easy and
effective way to avoid liability.
59
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030(a)(5) and 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012). See Christopher Satti, A Call to (Cyber)
Arms: Applicable Statutes and Suggested Courses of Action for the Celebrity iCloud Hacking
Scandal, 34 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 561, 580-81 (2016); Jessica E. Easterly, Terror in Tinseltown:
Who is Accountable When Hollywood Gets Hacked, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 331, 348 (2016).
60
Satti, supra note 59, at 580.
61
Id. at 580-81.
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values, some privacy laws, which have been on the books for quite some time, are
beginning to be used more frequently and more effectively.
Similarly, in 2014, nude photos of many celebrities, including Jennifer
Lawrence, were leaked and published on many websites62. While efforts to quickly
remove the photos were not particularly effective, there have been two convictions
under the CFAA. Apparently, most of the photos were obtained as a result of at
least two, apparently independent, phishing scams whereby the hackers convinced
the celebrities to divulge username and password information. Both convictions
were obtained under a section of the CFAA prohibiting unauthorized accessing of
a protected computer63 . While both faced up to 5 years in prison, one defendant
was sentenced to 18 months in October 201664 and the other to 9 months in January
201765.
We are beginning to see the results of some public outrage because of these
celebrity hackings. Regarding the Jennifer Lawrence incident, the publication of
the stolen photographs “has been lambasted by the public and media for being a
gross invasion of privacy . . . Beloved public figures like Jennifer Lawrence, made
vulnerable by having their naked bodies non-consensually exposed to the world,
are . . . sympathetic characters.”66
Public outrage has also been evident a few times regarding the failure of
existing Peeping Tom statutes to successfully prosecute “upskirt photographers.”67
There have been several instances where upskirt photographers escaped conviction
either because of narrow interpretations of “reasonable expectation of privacy” or
because of the specific language in the relevant statute. In 2014 the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court overturned a conviction under the state’s Peeping Tom
statute because the statute required proof that the person photographed be “nude or
partially nude.”68 Even though the “victim” was a transit officer who was part of a
sting operation and there was ample evidence of the upskirt photography, the court
62

See Easterly, supra note 56, at 334-35.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (2012); See Satti, supra note 56, at 581-82; Easterly, supra note 59,
at 348-49.
64
Alan Yuhas, Hacker Who Stole Nude Photos of Celebrities Gets 18 Months in Prison, The
Guardian (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/27/nude-celebrityphotos-hacker-prison-sentence-ryan-collins.
65
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strictly interpreted the language of the statute – because she was not nude or
partially nude.69 The public outcry was immediate70 and two days after the court’s
decision, the governor signed into law new language to close the loophole71.
Similarly, in Georgia, a 6-3 decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals
overturned the conviction of an upskirt photographer because the relevant statute
required that the photograph or recording be taken “in any private place and out of
public view.”72 The court ruled that “place” referred to a physical location, rather
than a part of the body, and since the recording was done in a public grocery store,
it was not done in a private place as required by the statute.73 There has been a great
deal of public outrage about the decision and it is probably just a matter of time
before the Georgia legislature fixes the loophole74.
Another incident involving what many would likely deem to be an invasion
of privacy has also sparked a call to action – most notably from the court rendering
the decision. In the case mentioned earlier, regarding the photographer who
surreptitiously took photographs of his neighbors through their open windows from
his apartment, the New York Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, affirmed
the dismissal of an invasion of privacy action brought by the parents of two children
who were photographed75. Despite the fact that the subjects never knew about nor
gave permission to the taking of the photographs, despite the fact that the
photographs were of people in their own homes – and in some cases, in their
bedrooms, despite the fact that some of the individuals, including one of the
children, were recognizable from the photographs, and despite the fact that the
address of the building was publicly disclosed as part of one of the exhibitions of
69

Id.
Haimy Assefa, Massachusetts Court Says ‘Upskirt’ Photos Are Legal, CNN (Mar. 6, 2014, 7:33
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/05/us/massachusetts-upskirt-photography/.
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Mark Mermot, Update: Massachusetts Bans ‘Upskirt’ Photography, NPR (Mar. 7, 2014, 9:00
AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/03/06/286690512/read-it-and-rate-it-courtrules-upskirt-photos-are-legal.
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PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/state--regional-govt--politics/senate-votes-ban-upskirtinggeorgia/lqjMcLuH55z6YZBPcV5K4M/..
75
Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015). See Hili Perlson, Voyeuristic
Photographer Arne Svenson Wins New York Appellate Court Case, ARTNET NEWS (April 10,
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the photographs, the case was dismissed. New York has never adopted the
traditional common law tort of invasion of privacy, but rather, has statutory
protection that addresses only the misappropriation prong of the tort76. Accordingly,
the court held that the First Amendment value of the photographs as art, along with
an absence of traditional commercial appropriation, required a dismissal of the
claim77.
The court held that “the defendant’s conduct, however disturbing it may be,
cannot properly, under the current state of the law, be deemed so ‘outrageous’ that
it went beyond the decency and the protections” of the statutes78. The court
continued, “we do not, in any way, mean to give short shrift to plaintiffs’ concerns79.
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be rightfully offended by the
intrusive manner in which the photographs were taken in this case. However, such
complaints are best addressed to the legislature.”80
In an area of the law that may become the poster child for public outrage as
a driver of change, 35 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation
to ban so-called “revenge porn,” or the nonconsensual publication of sexually
graphic or intimate photographs or video81. Typically, it is an ex-husband or exboyfriend who distributes these photos or videos without the consent of his prior
partner. In addition to legislation, many social media sites, including Google,
Twitter and Reddit, largely in response to the public outcry, have also banned the
practice82.
An example of what might be better described as public outcry, rather than
public outrage, about half of the states have passed, and almost all of the states have
proposed, legislation that bans employers from requiring the disclosure of
passwords related to an employee’s or an applicant’s social media accounts.83 In
76
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See Jordan M. Blanke, The Legislative Response to Employers’ Requests for Password
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2010, there was a well-publicized story about a job applicant in Maryland, who was
required by a prospective employer to disclose his Facebook log-in and password
as part of his job application process84. In 2012, largely in response to the public
outcry from this incident, Illinois, Maryland, California and Michigan became the
first states to pass legislation to curb this practice, with many other states modelling
their legislation after those first efforts85.
In recent decades, we have seen changes in social norms and behavior
regarding copyright protection, first in the 1980s and 1990s regarding software, and
then again in the late 1990s and early 2000s regarding digital music86. One
significant difference, however, is that the drivers of the change in those cases were
the content holders – the software companies and the music labels – and they had
the significant “teeth” of the copyright law behind them. Lawrence Lessig wrote
about how far behind protection for privacy is compared to protection for
intellectual property, largely because of the traditional view of intellectual property
as property87. It takes much longer to effect change if the general public is the driver
rather than a defined group with a specific interest involved.
Another interesting example of outrage – although it may more properly be
described as fear – dates back to the nomination of potential Supreme Court Justice
Robert Bork. After a local Washington, D.C. reporter was able to obtain the history
of all of Bork’s videotape rentals from his local video store, a number of
Congressmen learned that these type of records were actually being maintained88.
84
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In very short order, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act of 198889.
Fortunately for members of Congress, their outrage – or fear – can be immediately
remedied; unfortunately, for society, it generally takes a long time for public
outrage to effect change.
WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
While public outrage can often trigger quick legislative response, it usually
takes a good bit of time for social normative behavior to evolve. With regard to
informational privacy, it becomes even more difficult because of the ever-changing
technology and its immediate effect on daily life. Too often, this comes with a ready
acceptance of a diminished privacy. There is reason, however, to be optimistic that
the tide is beginning to turn when it comes to society’s expectation of privacy and
evolving social norms. Specifically, there are six themes or developments regarding
privacy that are making the environment ripe for changes in values, social norms,
and privacy laws:
1. The shift from an emphasis on notice and choice to collection and use90.
While this is mostly attributable to the utter failure of notice and consent to
provide any real privacy protection, the reality is that it is more important
now to try to limit the collection and use of data - both data that has already
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

been collected and that which has not. Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity
theory is largely responsible for driving this change91.
The recognition of the importance of trust as it pertains to privacy. Neil
Richards and Woodrow Hartzog recently wrote that “modern privacy law is
incomplete because from its inception it has failed to account for the
importance of trust.”92 The role of trust in privacy relationships is beginning
to emerge as an integral part of the normative value of privacy.
The recognition that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is –
and always should have been described as – solely an objective test93. This
will empower courts to more accurately assess, based upon normative data,
what “reasonable expectations” truly are and should be.
All of the efforts to convince people to design for privacy are starting to pay
dividends94 . Furthermore, people are realizing that both privacy and
security solutions need to be designed harmoniously95. NIST’s recent
publication is a perfect example of this: Security and Privacy Controls for
Information Systems and Organizations96.
Peer pressure. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will
become effective in May 2018 in the European Union97. Its omnibus
approach to data protection is a stark contrast to the sectoral approach taken
by the United States.98
Privacy as strategy. Companies are beginning to realize that privacy pays.
Richards and Hartzog wrote “If people don’t trust a company, they are more
likely to switch to a competitor.”99 While NIST guidelines are required for
federal agencies only, private industry has adopted many of the security
standards set forth in its Cybersecurity Framework100. It is hoped that many
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companies will also adopt the principles of its Privacy Framework101.
Additionally, while the GDPR pertains only to the EU and its citizens, many
U.S. companies function globally and will have to comply with the new
standards anyway, and are expected to adopt some of those standards across
the board102. Companies are realizing that it makes sense for them to
embrace and sell privacy.
CONCLUSION
One of the drivers of social change has always been outrage. We are
beginning to see a number of examples of changes occurring because of
dissatisfaction with current privacy standards.103 There is often a swift legislative
response, but it usually takes longer for social values or norms to adjust. It appears
that the environment is ripe for change to take place. People’s actual “expectations
of privacy” may finally be able to shape new privacy values and norms for our
digital world.
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